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Abstract—Many mixed-criticality systems are composed of a
RTOS (Real-Time Operating System) and a GPOS (General
Purpose Operating System), and we deﬁne them as mixed-time-
sensitive systems. Complexity, isolation, real-time latency, and
overhead are the main metrics to evaluate such a mixed-time-
sensitive system (MTSS). These metrics may conﬂict with each
other, so it is difﬁcult for them to be consistently optimized. Most
existing implementations only optimize part of the above metrics
but not all.
As the ﬁrst contribution, this paper provides a detailed analysis
of performance inﬂuencing factors which are exerted by various
runtime mechanisms of existing MTSSs. We ﬁgure out the
difference in performance across system designs, including task
switch, memory management, interrupt handling, and resource
isolation. We propose the philosophy of utilizing TrustZone
characteristics to optimize various mechanisms in MTSS.
The second contribution is to propose a TrustZone-based
solution - termed TZDKS - for MTSS. Appropriate utilization
of TrustZone extensions helps TZDKS to implement (i) virtu-
alization environment for GPOS and RTOS, (ii) high efﬁcient
task switch, memory access, interrupt handling and device
access which are veriﬁed by experiments. Therefore, TZDKS can
achieve a full-scale balance amongst aforementioned metrics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, many applications require integrating components
with different levels of criticality on one physical platform, in
order to meet stringent non-functional requirements relating to
cost, space, weight, heat generation and power consumption.
This kind of system is deﬁned as a mixed-criticality system
[5]. The most common case is that a real-time system and
a non-real-time interactive system are mixed and integrated
on one platform, which is deﬁned as a mixed-time-sensitive
system (MTSS) in this paper, also deemed as a special Dual-
Criticalitiy System [4].
The performance of MTSS is determined by many metrics,
such as complexity, isolation [9], real-time latency, and over-
heads (of merging different OSs). These metrics may conﬂict
with each other, so can hardly be consistently optimized. For
example, isolation and complexity collide with performance or
overhead. There are many approaches to design and implement
MTSS, which can be classiﬁed as two sorts. The traditional
way is to extend popular GPOS, e.g, Linux. This method
usually deploys a small real-time kernel at the underlying
of GPOS, and takes GPOS as a pseudo real-time task. We
call it a dual-kernel system [11]. A dual-kernel system does
not require extra hardware support, and only introduces a low
overhead [11]. However, it needs to modify the GPOS kernel
heavily, which results in high cost in complexity and ﬂexibility.
Additionally, insufﬁcient isolation between OSs leads to many
security and reliability problems [15]. As an instance, Linux
often goes down because of a bug in a device driver, and
the same bug may also lead to the whole system’s failure
in Xenomai [11]. In contrast, virtualization-based method
becomes a more popular and rapid method to design a MTSS
through integrating RTOS and GPOS in two virtual machines.
This method can provide better security isolation and lower
complexity, so it has the advantages of simple development
and ideal isolation. However, both OSs suffer from high
overhead and remarkable decrease of executing performance.
The hypervisor must be redesigned to meet the real-time
requirement. Moreover, it heavily relies on hardware supports,
which increases the cost of the whole system [12].
The TrustZone technology, which is developed to provide
a trusted executing environment, has attracted our attention.
With the hardware isolation support, a GPOS may run on
the TrustZone-enabled CPU without modiﬁcation, which leads
to a low development cost. Furthermore, as a light-weight
isolation scheme, TrustZone introduces a small overhead in
software. Therefore, its characteristics do help to develop a
MTSS with all-round balance amongst the metrics we focus.
As the ﬁrst contribution, this paper provides a detailed
analysis of performance inﬂuencing factors which are ex-
erted by various runtime mechanisms of existing MTSSs.
We ﬁgured out the difference in efﬁciency across system
designs such as task switch, memory management, interrupt
handling, and resource isolation. We propose the philoso-
phy of utilizing TrustZone characteristics to optimize various
mechanisms in MTSS. The second contribution of the paper
is to propose a Trustzone-based solution for MTSS, termed
TZDKS (TrustZone-based Dual-Kernel System). Appropriate
utilization of TrustZone extension helps TZDKS implement
(i) virtualization environment for GPOS and RTOS, (ii) high
efﬁcient task switch, memory access, interrupt handling and
device access which are veriﬁed by experiments. Therefore,
TZDKS achieves a full-scale balance among aforementioned
metrics. We believe that our TZDKS is a safe and low-cost
solution as the TrustZone-build-in ARM platforms have been
used in almost all engineering ﬁelds.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces
related work; Section III gives the design philosophy; Section
IV describes the TZDKS implementation; Section V evaluates
the performance of TZDKS, with conclusions offered in
Section VI.
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II. RELATED WORK
A. Two Common Solutions for Integrating Embedded System
A dual-kernel MTSS introduces a small real-time kernel
into the underlying of GPOS, and takes GPOS as a pseudo
real-time task. RTOS has a higher priority than GPOS, and
consequently GPOS only runs during the idle periods of
RTOS. That is to say, when the IDLE task is switched on,
a switcher module will be invoked to save the state of RTOS,
and restores the state of GPOS, then RTOS will be activated as
the timer (belongs to RTOS) interrupting GPOS, and will do
rescheduling for the real-time tasks. So this is called as idle-
scheduling strategy. RTLinux, RTAI, Xenomai and RTThread
[6] [11] are products of dual-kernel system, and are widely
applied in industrial systems.
In a virtualization-based MTSS, a hypervisor may be used to
manage shared resources and isolate the OSs, and a GPOS can
execute aside a RTOS in two virtual machines (VM). The up-
to-date avionics systems speciﬁcation - ARINC 653 [14] - is a
typical example. This speciﬁcation requires integrating many
subsystems (such as ﬂight control system, environment control
system, and amusement system) into a virtualized platform
on modern aircraft. Virtualization has also been developed
in the IO system of a MTSS. I/O virtualization [18] [17]
[10] enables time and space multiplexing of I/O devices, by
mapping multiple logical I/O devices upon a smaller number
of physical devices. More than just provide more device ports,
this technology can also reduce the software overhead and
enhance the I/O performance and timing predictability.
These two MTSSs always behave oppositely in many as-
pects, and detailed analysis will be presented in section III.
B. TrustZone and TrustZone-based virtualization
ARM TrustZone [16] is a hardware-based security extension
technology incorporated into ARM processors. It enables a
single physical processor to execute instructions in one of two
operating worlds: the normal world (NW) and the secure world
(SW). The isolation mechanisms are well deﬁned. Access
permissions are strictly under the control of SW, which forbids
access of secure resources from NW. As the processor only
runs in one world at a time, to enter the other world requires
context switch via a special instruction called the Secure
Monitor Call (SMC). In order to facilitate the application
development, the GlobalPlatform consortium develops the
TEE client API speciﬁcation [8].
The idea of using TrustZone as a virtualization technique in
embedded systems was ﬁrst introduced by Frenzel et al [7].
TrustZone extensions help to virtualize a system in two ways:
(1) Use system access capabilities of the secure world to
build a hypervisor that can control VMs running in NW.
SierraVisor is an example of such way.The SierraVisor
Hypervisor [3] leverages hardware security extensions of
TrustZone to run multiple, high-level operating systems
concurrently. The guest operating systems (OS) are aware
of the fact that they are running on top of a hypervisor,
so minor modiﬁcations must be made to the guest OS.
Guest kernel and applications run in their usual privilege
modes respectively. Furthermore, each guest executes in
an isolated environment with low overhead.
(2) Use the efﬁcient switch mechanism of the Secure Monitor
to host a dual-OS system (Secure OS and Normal OS).
Most TrustZone-based virtualization systems [13] [15] are
constructed in this way. SafeG [15] is designed to concur-
rently host a RTOS and a GPOS on TrustZone-enabled
ARM SoC devices. SafeG takes advantage of TrustZone
security extensions to provide full system access to trusted
software, and limit the capabilities of software running in
the normal world.
III. BALANCING DESIGN PHILOSOPHY OF TZDKS
A. Dual-kernel vs Virtualization
Here we discuss four metrics mentioned before as key
points of system performance. Considering that it is difﬁcult
to test these metrics directly, we change to compare another
four testable mechanisms - tasks management, memory man-
agement, event management, and runtime environment - and
believe that they can reﬂect the performance of former metrics.
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Fig. 1. Main Task Switch Process in Different Systems
A.1 Tasks management. Both systems adopt a two-level
model for task management, and the main difference exists in
OS switch. Dual-kernel system’s RTOS kernel do scheduling
not only for its RT tasks, but also for running of GPOS. As
a contrast, a virtualization system adds an extra hypervisor
to manage the switch operation of GPOS/RTOS VMs. Figure
1 (a) gives a illustration how a given real-time task τ and
GPOS are alternately executing, while the process with the
same goal in a virtualization system is given in ﬁgure 1 (b).
As shown, GPOS is interrupted by a real-time timer, and the
interrupt handler stores the runtime context of GPOS, then
restores the context of the RTOS scheduler. If τ is ready, the
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RTOS scheduler will restore the context of τ . When the RTOS
scheduler ﬁnds no runnable task in the queue, the idle task will
be switched on, and it will invoke a system call to store the
context of itself, and restore the context of GOPS. In ﬁgure
1 (b), a hypervisor runs at the under-layer of two VMs, so
extra scheduling and context storing/restoring take place in
the process of VM switch.
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Fig. 2. Address Translation in Different Systems
A.2 Memory model. In the dual-kernel system as shown
in ﬁgure 2 (a), some physical memory is retained and locked
by RTOS, so GPOS can only use other physical memory,
though they both adopt two level (virtual/physical) address
translation. A virtualization system normally adopts three level
(virtual/real/physical) address translation shown in ﬁgure 2 (b).
A.3 Interrupt handling. Dual-kernel system ensures that
interrupts are ﬁrst treated by RTOS. Interrupts belonging to
GPOS will be put into a pipeline and then be progagated to
GPOS when there are no more runnable tasks in RTOS. In
virtualization system, all the interrupts will be ﬁrstly treated
by the hypervisor (or domain 0 OS), then be forwarded to
VMs. Though IO virtualization [10] is able to route interrupts
to VMs directly, unfortunately there are very few commodity
platforms with IO virtualization support.
A.4 Runtime environment. A dual-kernel system integrates
two OSs by patching the GPOS kernel and adding many
intercoupling function in two kernels, so there is no logical
independent environment for GPOS or RTOS, and no effective
defence to harmful interference from each other. As known,
virtualization systems have well-deﬁned and isolated environ-
ments for each OS.
We have following observations through the comparison.
• C.1 Dual-kernel system achieves better real-time latency
and suffers from a lower overhead, because
– less context store/restore (3 vs 4 times in ﬁgure 1).
– less times of scheduling in task switch (1 vs 2 times
in ﬁgure 1).
– shorter interrupt latency, because interrupts go to
RTOS directly.
– shorter memory access latency, for less translation
layers.
– less waste CPU time, because it saves all the idle
time of RTOS to run GPOS.
• C.2 Virtualization system is much better than dual-kernel
system in aspects of complexity and isolation.
– lower complexity is beneﬁted from the advanced VM
capabilities, such as cloning and live migration.
– virtualization provides software&hardware isolation,
which brings it ideal reliability and security.
B. Design Philosophy of TZDKS
TZDKS is derived from the following fundamental princi-
ples.
• at least two kernels are required to handle different time-
sensitive tasks’ management.
• simpliﬁed structures. Dual-kernel system has less com-
ponents and management levels, which is the main cause
of the less overhead and the lower latency.
• hardware virtualization support. Both isolation and high
performance require that.
• replacement or simpliﬁcation of the hypervisor. This
software layer decreases the performance.
Normal virtualization technologies seem more heavy-weight
than above principles, while TrustZone - a lightweight iso-
lation extension of ARM - comes into our view. We can
easily get two isolated domains (or virtual machines) with the
assistance of the following TrustZone hardware mechanisms.
• Each physical CPU is virtualized into two virtual CPUs:
one for the secure world and the other for the non-secure
world. Cache of each level is also virtualized and isolated.
• TrustZone Address-Space Controller (TZASC) allows
partition of memory, which can be exploited to guaran-
tee strong spatial isolation. Therefore, TrustZone-enabled
system only has/needs MMU support for two-level ad-
dress translation.
• TrustZone Protection Controller (TZPC) allows devices
to be conﬁgured as secure or non-secure, that allows the
isolation of devices at the hardware level.
• Generic Interrupt Controller (GIC) supports the coex-
istence of secure and non-secure interrupt sources. It
allows the conﬁguration of secure interrupts with a higher
priority, and also allows to assign IRQs and FIQs to
secure or non-secure interrupt sources.
Some opensource projects like Trusted Firmware [2] have
provided sound support for two domains and virtual-machine-
like interfaces to Linux and general RTOS, and also give us
ideal platform foundation.
So it seems that it is an obstacle to pursue greater perfor-
mance in designing this new system. We are fortunate enough
to discover that many mechanisms provided by TrustZone are
very helpful to improving the performance of TZDKS - our
TrustZone-based Dual-Kernel System.
• With the assistance of hardware memory isolation, two-
level address translation can be implemented in the
TZDKS virtual memory subsystem, and makes it have
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Fig. 3. Address Translation and Device Access in TZDKS
the same efﬁciency as the memory mapping in a bare-
metal OS (ﬁgure 3).
• Through the proper conﬁguration of GIC, interrupts can
be routed to the owner kernel by hardware, that avoids
software interrupt forwarding. Both kernels beneﬁt from
the simpliﬁcation of interrupts management (ﬁgure 3).
• Devices can be partitioned according to requirement, so
the IO software stacks can be simpliﬁed and the IO
latency can be kept at the lowest level.
• Some software characters of TrustZone can also be ex-
ploited. For example, we can use the monitor mode as
a context switcher for two kernels, so as to replace the
functions of a hypervisor. We will implement the kernel
switch shown in Figure 4, apparently it has the same
efﬁciency as the traditional dual-kernel system.
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Fig. 4. Tasks Switch Process in TZDKS
In a word, TrustZone extension provides sufﬁcient support
to achieve a balance among isolation, virtualization, and
performance for dual-kernel structure.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF TZDKS
A. Architecture of TZDKS
There are more than one possible structures may be adopted
to integrate a RTOS and a GPOS in a TrustZone-enabled
multi-core platform. For example, RTOS can use CPU cores
in sharing (with GPOS) way or in exclusive way.TZDKS
chooses the sharing way, named multi-core shared structure
(MSS). In MSS, all CPU cores are time-shared by two OSs.
MSS can achieve high processor utilization, so an uniprocessor
platform can also support it. It is more suitable to develop a
dual-criticality system based on MSS because time slices can
be neatly deployed to meet the requirements of high critical
applications. A complicated OS switch mechanism should be
designed in a MSS system. In order to implement a smooth OS
switch, we leverage the monitor mode of TrustZone. As shown
in ﬁgure 5, there are two software stacks located in the two
worlds of TrustZone-enabled environment on TZDKS. Consid-
ering that SW has higher priority than NW, we build RTOS in
SW for high criticailty guarantee. The SW stack is composed
by the monitor module, RTOS and real-time tasks/services,
and provides a real-time environment for the development
of applications which need to guarantee speciﬁc deadlines.
While the NW stack is composed by GPOS and applications,
and provides a rich environment for running human-machine
interaction as well as internet-based applications.
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Fig. 5. TZDKS Architecture
B. Components of TZDKS
1) RTOS: RTOS is the partly modiﬁed version of a typical
real-time system - μcOSII. The main modiﬁcations on the
μcOSII kernel side includes: (i) a new port to enter-into/exit-
from GPOS, (ii) implementation of idle-scheduling, that is to
modify the idle task as an entrance for GPOS. (iii) optional
support for standard TEE (Trusted Execution Environment).
2) Monitor: The monitor component executs as a slave
module, though it runs in EL3 mode of ARM CPU. In fact, the
monitor is only activated through two ways. One is through a
SMC call, the other is through FIQ when GPOS is executing.
Functions of the monitor component includes: (i) SMC service
ports, (ii) timer interrupt handler for RTOS in the period of
GPOS running, (iii) world switcher.
3) GPOS: GPOS is an enhanced Linux system. Actu-
ally, Linux can run in the normal world without modiﬁ-
cation. Some new modules have been added to Linux for
the communication with RTOS, including the kernel drivers
for TrustZone(which encapsulates SMC ports as a pseudo-
device), application libraries (provide communication ports
and standard TEE service ports deﬁned by the GloblePlatform
consortium), some daemon services for the RTOS requirement,
and a conﬁguration module for RTOS.
C. Working Process of TZDKS
The system starts booting on the secure world side by per-
forming a series of initialization operations, such as allocating
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different resources to the predeﬁned worlds and loading the ex-
ception/SMC vectors to the predeﬁned addresses. Afterwards,
the RTOS kernel is loaded and started. The whole system will
run with RTOS as the main body, while GPOS will be loaded
and executed as a special task of RTOS, i.e. the IDLE task.
Each OS owns its private timer source. Meanwhile, different
interrupt types are conﬁgured to each OS (IRQ for GPOS,
and FIQ for RTOS). IRQs are masked during the secure world
execution for the priority of real-time tasks.
There are two kinds of event can trigger OS switch, SMC
instruction and interrupt. When CPU is executing in the GPOS
mode, a SMC call or a FIQ interrupt will trap CPU into
the monitor mode, and the monitor will store environment
information of GPOS, then redirect the control to the scheduler
or the ISR (Interrupt Service Routing) in RTOS, thus the
system will switch to RTOS. Switch to GPOS from RTOS
is under the control of the idle-scheduling policy of TZDKS.
To do this, RTOS stores the current environment and triggers
a SMC call to the monitor, so the monitor will restore the
GPOS context directly.
D. Mixed-Criticality Design
In TZDKS, idle-scheduling policy enables that RTOS has
a higher scheduling priority than GPOS, and consequently
GPOS is only scheduled during the idle periods of RTOS.
We ﬁnd that pure idle-scheduling makes some troubles for
GPOS even when the CPU is not fully occupied by RTOS.
One problem is timer loss. That is because GPOS (with the
lowest priority) may be blocked by other real-time tasks for
a long time, and which will make GPOS lose some timer
interrupts. The other problem is the priority reverse brought
by communications between two OSs. Some tasks in RTOS
possibly require communicate with GPOS, and maybe wait
GPOS for a long time. We hence add another real-time task
τG also serving as a container of GPOS (when τG get CPU, it
will switch GPOS on), but with a variable priority. Due to the
limitation of the pages, we will give the detailed description
of τG in the future paper.
V. EVALUATION
We implemented TZDKS on a Hikey development board
with Trustzone-enabled. Hikey has an octa-core Cortex-A53
CPU (1.2 GHz), 2GB memory, 8GB eMMC storage. Because
μcOSII only supports uniprocessor, we modiﬁed the power
management functions in the under level of the software so
that only one core is left running. Nevertheless, the design of
TZDKS can also support a multi-core RTOS, and the following
experiments also reﬂect the performances in the multi-core
environment.
In order to evaluate the performance, four metrics discussed
in Section IV are measured: Complexity, Overhead, isolation,
and RT latency. Because isolation is hardly to be veriﬁed
by experiments, we conduct a discussion around supporting
mechanisms. Note that, in order to ensure the readability of
experimentation results, we have normalized the result data,
because different Linux versions are used in target platforms.
A. System Complexity
Beneﬁting from the TrustZone light-weight virtualization,
we can rapidly develop the prototype of TZDKS in a few
weeks. At the side of adapted μcOSII, we only modifed two
exception handler functions and IDLE task body to make the
OS running in the secure world. At the Linux side, it can run
directly in the normal world without modeﬁcation.
TABLE I
NECESSARY CODE LINES ADDED TO THE TZDKS COMPONENTS
Linux μcOS Trusted Firmware etc.
Code Lines 0 < 300 < 100
Besides that, some code lines were added to the Trusted
Firmware to enable a timer for μcOS. Applications and their
developments can be migrated to the new system easily. Table
I lists the code lines needed to develop the TZDKS. We note
that Xenomai require a patch to Linux kernel which has more
than 15 thousands code lines [1]. TZDKS obviously has a very
low complexity notwithstanding it is only a prototype system.
B. Evaluation on Isolation
Note that we mainly consider the isolation for RTOS in
a dual-criticality system. In TZDKS, access permissions to
memory and peripherals are under the control of hardware con-
trollers, and resources belonging to RTOS can not be accessed
by GPOS. Interrupts are conﬁgured (in GIC) as two groups:
group 0 and group 1. Group 0 interrupts are only hardware
routed to RTOS, while group 1 are only to GPOS. These
hardware components have been built in almost all current
ARMv8 processors. While in a virtualization system, memory
isolation is normally supported by hardware assistances (such
as VTx). Hardware isolation for peripherals and interrupts also
require extra hardware assistances(such as VT-d), which suf-
fers from signiﬁcant system cost. Therefore, TZDKS provides
ﬁne isolation for RTOS with low-cost hardware.
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Fig. 6. Unixbench Results
C. Overhead
Due to the lack of method to test the integral performance
of TZDKS, we use UnixBench to measure the comprehensive
performance of Linux (GPOS) with zero load in RTOS. The
results will reﬂect the performance of TZDKS. Afterwards,
we compare the performance with other three Linux systems:
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a native Linux, a Xenomai Linux, and a Linux in a Xen VM.
As shown in ﬁgure 6, we can see that there is almost no
performance loss in both GPOSs of TZDKS and Xenomai
Linux when the load of RTOS is very light. TZDKS is even
better than Xenomai as a whole, and a possible reason is
that Xenomai has more cost of context switch than TZDKS
(we will explain this later in the task switch experiment).
As a contrast, Linux in the Xen virtual machine has obvious
performance loss.
D. Interrupt Latency for RTOS
We measure the time from a interrupt triggered to the
interrupt handler running. Two thousands times SGI (Software
Generated Interrupt) were repeated in the experiment, and
we lists the maximum, minimum, average, as well as MSE
(Mean Squared Error) of latencies in table II. We compare the
latencies with the bare-metal μcOS, and results show that the
interrupt latencies in RTOS of TZDKS are slightly inﬂuenced
by GPOS, but are still deterministic and short enough for most
real-time applications. We also run the latency test (of the real-
time timer) provided by Xenomai package (the test can not
give MSE results), and the results show that TZDKS always
has shorter latencies than Xenomai.
TABLE II
INTERRUPT LATENCY FOR RTOS
Max
(cycles/μs)
Min
(cycles/μs)
Average
(cycles/μs)
MSE
(cycles/μs)
μcOS in
TZDKS 2530 / 2.11 410 / 0.34 1001.1 / 0.83 632.6 / 0.53
Bare-metal
μcOS 1377 / 1.15 380 / 0.32 823.5 / 0.69 313.1 / 0.26
Xenomai
Cobalt 15069 / 12.56 1382 / 1.16 3889 / 3.24 - / -
E. Context Switch Latency for Real-Time Tasks
In this measurement, we measure the CPU cycles used in the
process shown in upper half of Figure 4, e.g. the longest time
of a ready real-time task τ waiting to run. Results in table III
show that the longest time is less than 20 μs in TZDKS when
GPOS has very high load (especially when there are many
EXECL calls), so the context switch performance is good
enough for most applications. We run the switchtest provided
by Xenomai package to test the performance of thread switch
in kernel mode of Xenomai, and the maximum number of
switches is no more than 1800 per second on our board (the
average switch period is more than 550 μs ).We think this
result probably can not reﬂect the true performance difference
between TZDKS and Xenomai for diverse methods and details
in each test, but it still shows that TZDKS has a good task
switch performance, and more researches will concern it in
the further work.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The mixed-time-sensitive system, which combines different
types of OSs on unique hardware platform, has wide require-
ments and applications in many ﬁelds such as robot, aviation
etc. Two traditional solutions, dual-kernel and virtualization,
TABLE III
CONTEXT SWITCH LATENCY
Max
(cycles/μs)
Min
(cycles/μs)
Average
(cycles/μs)
MSE
(cycles/μs)
GPOS to RT-
task in TZDKS 19475 / 16.23 1757 / 1.47 4884.3 / 4.07 3619.8 / 3.02
Task switch in
Bare-metal μcOS 1629 / 1.15 642 / 0.54 1079.5 / 0.90 312.8 / 0.26
provide just reverse merit and demerit in different perfor-
mances. This paper proposes an idea to realize the dual-kernel
system based on the TrustZone isolation, and give the design of
TZDKS to verify this idea. TZDKS achieves suitable balance
among complexity, isolation, latency, and overhead.
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